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On the probable cause issue, the CCA refers to the many
sightings by witnesse.s of petitioner's truck, particularly the
identification of the pick-up by one of the witnesses as on~ at which
the victim had stopped to converse with the driver earlier in the
day. (That this particular identification was known to the police
prior to the arrest apparently is conceded by petitioner. cert
petition at 52 n. 56.] The CCA also notes the awareness of the
arresting officers of the outstanding warrant for petitioner.
In response, the State aligns itself with the CCA.
Discussion: Again, this appears to '" be a "totality of the
circumstances" issue similar to the one raised in Gregg. And
again, although certain of the circumstances may be disturbing,
the question is a factual one and the determinations below weigh
heavily against its merit.
Conclusion: Certiorari may be limited to question 1.
4.

'

ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA, 75-5844:

Facts: The facts provided by the present pleadings are
very sketchy. No response has been received. The evidence
petitioner was convicted on is not stated either in the cert petition
or in the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion. The cert petition
does not provide a statement of facts.
The opinion surrunarily relates that Richard Lowe, an
attendant of a gas station, wasshot and killed during an armed
robbery committed by petitioner and one Calvin Arceneaux.
Petitioner and Arceneaux entered the station office unarmed but
removed a revolver from a desk drawer and used it to threaten,
and finally kill; the attendant. The robbery netted petitioner
and his accomplice two guns, two empty money bags and three
dollars. The murder weapon was entered into evidence.
Contentions: Petitioner raises only a capital punishment
question:
1. Whether the imposition and carrying out
of the sentence of death for the crime of first degree
murder under the law of Louisiana violates the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States? 11
11

Discussion: Obviously petitioner confessed or Arceneaux
testified at the trial, but no confession issue was raised below
and although petitioner raises prosecutorial discretion in his
capital punislunent argument, he does not allude to any deals
made involving Arceneaux. The status of Arceneaux is not revealed.
Similarly, no search and seizure issue was raised below. Aside
from the capital punislunent issue and the Taylor issue (women
were excluded from petitioner's grand and petit juries), petitioner
raised no substantive federal issues in the State Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The particulars of this case remain to be
divulged. On the issues presented, however, there is no need to
limit certiorari.
5.

WOODSON and WAXTON v. NORTH CAROLINA, 75-5491:

Facts: Petitioners' convictions for first degree (felony)
murder were based on their own testimony at trial and on the
testimony of two accomplices, Tucker and Carroll, who were
permitted to plead to lesser offenses and were sentenced to terms
of imprisonment of from 20-30 years.
The testimony established that petitioners, Waxton (age 24)
and Woodson (age 23), and two other black men- -Tucker (18) and
Carroll (19)--planned the armed robbery of an E-Z Shop in Dunn,
N.C. Tucker and petitioner Waxton entered the store while Carroll
and petitioner Woodson remained in a car outside. As she was
about to wait on him, petitioner Waxton shot and killed the white
shop attendant. [The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
the only significant difference in the testimony relates to who fired
the shot that killed the store attendant; and, since each admitted
bein~ one of the four who conspired to rob the shop, legally it
makes no difference whether Waxton or Tucker did it. Waxton,
understandably, points the finger at Tucker. Tucker accuses
Waxton, The testimony of Carroll and Woodson, although not
eyewitnesses, strongly implicates petitioner Waxton. No findings
are made on this point below.]
Contentions: Petitioners present only the capital punishment question:
''Whether the imposition and carrying out of
the sentence of death for the crime of murder under
the law of North Carolina violates the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States? 11
Conclusion:

Certiorari need not be limited.

.-

lfp/ss

4/1/76

April 1, 1976
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ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA
Capital Case - Louisiana Statute

Mandatory death penalty prescribed for a narrow range
of offenses, characterized as "murder in the first degree".
Murder in the first degree is defined as the killing of a
human being:
(1)

With specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm:
(a)

During the commission of an aggravated
felony (kidnapping, rape, burglary or
armed robbery);

(b)

An on-duty fireman or peace officer;

(c)

When the defendant has a prior murder
conviction or is serving a life sentence; or

(d)

The defendant has a specific intent to
kill "more than one person".

(e)

For hire.

Some of the factors in the Louisiana statute, that are
made elements of the crime itself, are included in other
statutes as "aggravating circumstances".
The Louisiana statute, to this point, is an attempt
to define narrowly the crimes for which a deat h sanction may
be imposed.

For the most part, the definitions are fairly

specific and objective in identifying the additional factors
that must be found.
Under Louisiana law, the jury - in every first degree
murder case - must be instructed by the judge that it may find

2.
a verdict for the lesser crimes of second degree murder or
manslaughter.

Failure so to instruct is reversible error,

and the nature of the evidence is immaterial.

Thus, the jury

has the right, always, to return a verdict of manslaughter
rather than for murder.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1

No. 75-5844

STANISLAUS ROBERTS,

)
)

. Petitioner,

)
·)

v.

On Writ of Certiorari to · the
Supreme Court of Louisiana.

)
)
)

STATE OF LOUISIANA.
[June

1976]

On August 18, 1973, in the early hours of the morning,.
Richard G. Lowe was found dead in the office of the gas station
at which he worked.

He had been shot four times in the head.

The police recovered four spent projedtiles .from a .38 caliber
pistol at the scene.
About six months la.ter, the . police recovered a . gun, sub ...
sequently identified as the murder weapon, from a cafe and beer

'

parlor operator.

y

The gun was traced back to th¢ petitioner.

Four men--petitioner, Huey Cormier, Everett Walls, and Calvin
Arcenaux--were subsequently arrested for complicity in the
murder.
At trial, Cormier, Walls, and Arceriaux testified against
petitioner.

Their testimony

2/ '

e~tablished-

that just before

1/ The gun, a .38 caliber revolver, was readily recognizable.
It was an "uncommon type gun,'' (R. 70) , which had been sold to the
owner of the gas station by a police ~fficer. The police force
had, after the shooting, been instructed to be on the lookout for
this gun.
2/ Since petitioner was convicted, we read the testimony in the
light most favorable to the prosecution.

No. 75-5844

.

midnight on August 17, petitioner had discussed with Walls and
Cormier the subject of "ripping off that old man at the station."
Petitioner indicated that Arcenaux was to accompany him.

Cormier

and Walls, however, declined to participate.
Arcenaux testified that on the early morning of August 18,
'he and petitioner went to the gas station and asked the eventual
victim, Lowe, for work.
available.

Lowe told them there were no jobs

They left, but crept back into the station office

through a rear entrance while Lowe was outside waiting on a car.
There was no evidence to indicate that either petitioner or
Arcenaux was armed at this point.
Arcenaux "crawled" to a desk drawer and removed from it a
pistol which belonged to the station owner.
Arcenaux to give him the pistol.
"was kind of mad when I had it.

Petitioner asked

According to Arcenaux, petitioner
He just said he wanted it because

he had never killed a white dude before, and he always wanted to
kill a white dude."

(R. 190).

When Lowe returned to the office,

petitioner held him by the collar and Arcenaux hit him while
they shoved him into a small back room.

When they had all been in

the room for about five minutes, a car drove up.
out and, posing as the station attendant,
three dollars worth of gas.

gav~

Arcenaux went

the motorist about

While still out in front, he heard

four shots from inside the station.
found Lowe on the floor, bleeding.

He went back inside and
Petitioner was no longer there.

Arcenaux grabbed some empty "money bags" and ran from the station.
Cormier testified that as he was walking home from a bar, he
saw Arcenaux run from the filling station.
and went to bed.

Cormier then went horne

Some time later he heard a knock on the door.

Petitioner was standing at the door, sweating.

When Cormier asked

petitioner why he was sweating, he replied that "he had just shcit
that old man . . . at the filling station."
petitioner was carrying a gun.

- 2 -

.•

Cormier also saw that

No. 75-5844

Petitioner was indicted by the grand jury on May 9, 1974,
on a presentment that he "did unlawfully with the specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, while engaged
in the armed robbery of Richard G. Lowe, commit first degree
murder by killing one Richard G. Lowe, in violation of Section

3/
One (1) of L.S.A.-R.S. 14:30."by the jury; the judge, as

He was found guilty as charged

~equired

by statute, sentenced him

to death.
The Louisiana legislature in 1973 revised the Louisiana
statutes relating to murder and the death penalty, apparently
in response to this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,· 408
U.S. 238 (1972).

Before these amendments, Louisiana law defined

only the crime of "murder," as the killing of a human being by
an offender with a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm, or by an offender engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery or simple

4/
robbery, even without an intent to kill.-

The jury was free to

return a verdict of guilty, guilty without capital punishment,

5/
guilty of manslaughter or not guilty.The legislature, in the 1973 amendments, changed this discretionary statute to one wholly mandatory, requiring that the
death penalty be imposed whenever the jury should find the defendant
guilty of the newly described crime of first degree murder.

This

~/ This version of the indictment includes immaterial amendments
made May 22, 1974, after the Court had convened on the first day
of the trial but before the trial had commenced.

!/

La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.

~/

La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 814

- 3 -

(1967).

No. 75-5844

new statute, under which petitioner was charged, provides in
part that first degree murder is the killing of a human being
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated

6/
rape, or armed robbery.The amended statute describes second degree murder in
much the same terms as those used by the prior statute to describe

6/ La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (as amended by La. Acts 1973,
Act 109):
"First degree murder.
First degree murder is the killing of ~ human being:
{1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill
or to ihflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill,
or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a fireman or a
peace officer' who was engaged in the performance of his
lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm and has pre.viously been
convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life
se~tence; or
(4)
When the offender has a specific intent to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; [or]
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit
murder and has been offered or has received anything of
value for committing the murder.
For the purposes of paragraph (2) herein, the term
peace officer shall be defined and include any constable,
sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game
warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison
guard, parole officer, probation of£icer, judge, district
attorney, assistant district attorney or district attorneys'
investigator.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree· murder shall
be punished by death ... Un 1975, §14.30(1) . was amended to add the crime of
aggravated burglary as a predicate felony for first degree
__
murder. Act No. 327, West's La. Sess. L. Serv. 1975, at 570-571~
_l

- 4 -
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No. 75-5844

]_/
murder.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being

when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm, ££ when the offender is engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain specified
felonies, including armed robbery, even though the offender has
no intent to kill.
Under the former statute, the jury had the choice in any case
where it found the defendant guilty of murder of returning either
a verdict of guilty, which required the imposition of the death
penalty, or a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, in

8/
which case the punishment was imprisonment at hard labor for life.Under the new statute the jury is required only to determine whether
both conditions existed at the time of the killing; if there was a
specific intent to kill, and

th~

offender was engaged in an armed

robbery, the offense is first degree murder and the mandatory
punishment is death.

If only one of these conditions existed,

the offense is second deqree murder and the mandatorv
]_/

ounishme~t

~~

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 (enacted La. Acts 1973 1 Act 111}:

"Second degree murder.
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or
to inflict great bodily harm; or
(2)
When the offender is engaged in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed
robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent
to kill.
Whoever commits the crime
shall be imprisoned at hard
not be eligible for parole,
of sentence :Eor a period of

of second degree murder
labor for life and shall
probation or suspension
twenty years."

[In 1975, §14:30.1 wa~ amended to increase the per~od of
pnrole ineligibility from twenty to forty years follow1ng a
conviction for second degree murder. Act. No. 380, West's La.
Sess. L. Serv. 1975, at 665.]

~/ La. Co~e Crim •. Proc: Ann. § 814 (19671 enumerated '~guilty
Wlt~out ca~1tal pun1shment" as one of the responsive verdicts
ava1lable 1n a murder case, La, Code, Crim. Proc, Ann,~ Art,
817 (1967) provided

- 5 -

No. 75-5844
i

imprisonment at hard labor for life.

Any qualification or

recommendation which a jury might add to its verdict--such as
a recommendation of mercy where the verdict is "guilty of first

9/
degree murder"--is without any effect.-- ........ "' .............

Thus, like the North Carolina statute discussed in Woodson
v. North Carolina, ante at

, the Louisiana murder statute leaves

no room at all for an individualized determination of whether the
death penalty is appropriate for the particular criminal who has
committed this particular crime in this particular way.

~I

9/
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 817 (1975 Supp.)
by La. Acts 1973, Act 125 § 1.

!

I

I

- 6 -

(as amended

.:§nprtttU <!fO'Url ttf tlrt ~tb ;§ta±tg

,.-ulrittghm. J). <!f. 2Ilbi~~

/

CHAMBER S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 17, 1976

Re:

No. 75-5844 - Roberts v. Louisiana

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.

sincerelyr

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

···'"

